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Czechoslovakia was created in 1918, when the Versailles Peace
Conference carved the lands of the neighboring Czech and Slovak
peoples out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and created a new
democratic state. This arranged marriage was a voluntary act of
self-determination by those two long-repressed peoples, but they
did not marry for love and they have not been very happy
together.
Ever since, the process of constitution-making in Czechoslova-
kia has been critically influenced by the historic division between
the Czechs and Slovaks. Now that the nation has cast away its
communist shackles, so smoothly and nonviolently that the process
has been dubbed the "Velvet Revolution," it has taken up the task
of drafting a new and democratic constitution. Predictably, the dif-
ferences between Czechs and Slovaks are proving to be the major
obstacle to an equally smooth resolution of the principal constitu-
tional issues.
In this Article,1 we discuss the approach of the newly renamed
Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) to four major con-
stitutional issues: federalism, the bill of rights, an independent ju-
diciary, and the separation of powers among the president, the
cabinet, and the federal legislature.
Before one can understand what is transpiring in the CSFR, a
brief review of the political and social history of the nation is nec-
essary. As with other Eastern European countries, many of Czech-
oslovakia's current difficulties originate not only in the effects of
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four decades of communism, but also in long-ago events ingrained
in the country's history. We therefore begin by considering the
roots of the current constitutional dilemma.
I. THE HISTORIcAL BACKGROUND
A constitution is a legal document, but it is more than that.
When it is created at a seminal moment in a nation's life, the con-
stitution reflects the triumphs and disappointments of a nation's
past and embodies its hopes for the future. To understand and in-
terpret such a document, one must be familiar with those tri-
umphs, disappointments, and hopes.
2
A. Before 1918
The Czech and Slovak nations, as they call themselves, share a
common ethnic heritage, religion, and almost identical languages.
They have also experienced a substantial amount of cultural inter-
action throughout their histories. Yet their practical union is a
comparatively recent creation, dating only from 1918.
For almost a thousand years, Slovakia was part of Hungary,
dominated by and subordinate to the Hungarian nobility. Most of
Slovakia's people consisted of peasants, with almost no indigenous
business or professional middle class, intelligentsia, or aristocracy.
Slovaks were essentially a source of cheap labor for the
Hungarians.
During this period the Czechs established an empire in Bohe-
mia and Moravia that reached its peak in the fourteenth century,
when it became the seat of the Holy Roman Empire. In contrast to
the Slovaks, the Czechs and Moravians developed a town culture,
with Prague becoming one of the great cities of Europe.
Early in the fifteenth century, the Protestant Reformation
swept the Czech Lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and made them
the cradle of Protestantism. Austria's Catholic armies invaded and
totally defeated the Protestant Czechs in 1620, ending Czech inde-
pendence for 300 years. The Czech aristocracy was destroyed and
Catholicism enforced. Despite the Austrian repression, the Czechs
ultimately became a very middle class, egalitarian, highly edu-
2 This section is based on Vladimir V. Kusin, Czechs and Slovaks: The Road to the
Current Debate, Report on Eastern Europe 4 (Oct 5, 1990); A. H. Hermann, A History of
the Czechs (Allen Lane, 1975); Jozef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (Praeger, 1955);
-Norman Stone and Eduard Strouhal, eds, Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and Crises 1918-88
(St. Martin's, 1989).
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cated, and cultured cosmopolitan people. Both then and later, the
Czechs were part of western-primarily German-culture and soci-
ety, while Slovakia, under Hungarian dominance, remained largely
rural and underdeveloped. Both nations continue to be overwhelm-
ingly Catholic, but Slovak Catholicism was and is much more
traditional.
In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks participated in the na-
tional revival movement, but their efforts were harshly rebuffed by
the Hungarians, who tried to "Magyarize" the Slovaks and other
national groups under Hungarian rule within the Austro-Hun-
garian empire. Some of the Slovak revival efforts were carried on
in conjunction with their Czech cousins, who were trying to assert
their own national identity within the Austrian part of the Empire.
Although efforts to establish a more independent political struc-
ture within the Austro-Hungarian Empire failed, the Czech Lands
rapidly industrialized and modernized.
When World War I broke out, the Czech and Slovak national-
ists saw their chance. Putting aside their social and cultural differ-
ences, Czech and Slovak leaders, with the help of American Czechs
and Slovaks, persuaded the United States, Britain, and France to
recognize the new nation of Czechoslovakia, whose independence
was declared on October 28, 1918. The boundaries of the new state
were defined and recognized by the Treaty of Versailles. The
leader of the Czechs, Tomas Masaryk, said at the time that it
would take 50 years for the Czechs and Slovaks to become one na-
tion. They had only 20 before Adolf Hitler came along.
B. 1918-1938
The First Czechoslovak Republic was a comparatively modern,
well-functioning democracy. It achieved the dual purposes of a
democratic government: preserving order and maintaining individ-
ual freedom. Because of this success, the First Republic has served
as a model for modern-day reformers. In particular, the Czechs and
Slovaks have turned to the 1920 Constitution for guidance in their
current constitution-writing process.
In designing their first constitution, the Czechs and Slovaks
looked to the West for inspiration and example, particularly to the
French parliamentary system with its tradition of multiple politi-
cal parties and coalition governments-a trend they reinforced by
constitutionally mandating a proportional representation method
1991]
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of election. 3 Although Czechoslovakia was formed as a union of two
neighboring peoples with quite separate political histories, the
framers adopted a unitary state rather than a federal system. Be-
cause there were twice as many Czechs as Slovaks, the rights of
Slovaks and other minorities were expressly guaranteed by a Bill
of Rights. But the founding fathers firmly resisted the idea of a
federation of two separate sovereign republics, the idea that domi-
nates the drafting of the new constitution today.
The 1920 Constitution organized the executive, legislative, and
judicial powers in traditional continental European fashion. The
following sections will examine the constitutional structure of the
First Republic as well as the extra-constitutional factors that af-
fected the structure in practice.
1. The executive.
Pre-World War II Czechoslovakia, like Austria and Weimar
Germany, had a dual executive, consisting of a president and a
government, both elected by the legislature. Executive dualism was
designed to keep the president, as the head of state, weak.4 It re-
sponded to a widespread fear of anything even remotely resem-
bling monarchy.
The Constitution of 1920 expressly conferred on the president
certain limited executive powers and reserved all other executive
powers to the government. Apart from being commander-in-chief,
the most significant powers granted the president were the right to
appoint and dismiss the prime minister and all other government
ministers; the right to dissolve parliament (called the National As-
sembly), except during the last six months of a presidential term;
and the right to exercise a suspensive veto.5 The president, how-
ever, did not enjoy the right of legislative initiative. That belonged
solely to the government and the Assembly. Also, every act of the
3 "Pre-Munich Czechoslovakia was a state of political parties .... The whole of public
life was penetrated... by the atmosphere of partisan politics." Edward Taborsky, Czecho-
slovak Democracy at Work 94 (George Allen & Unwin, 1945). Taborsky was a secretary to
the second President of the First Republic, Edward Benes.
' "[D]ualism in executive power is decidedly one of the shortcomings of the [1920]
Czechoslovak Constitution . . . [and] the authors of the Constitution . .. [in instituting
dualism] went further than was perhaps wise." Id at 18.
The president also had limited emergency powers in exceptional cases where parlia-
ment had delegated the legislative power to the government. In such cases, the president's
countersignature was a prerequisite to the statutory validity of government decrees. See the
Constitutional Charter of the Czecho-Slovak Republic § 64 ("1920 Constitution"), reprinted
as The Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, 179 Intl Conciliation 35, 55 (Oct 1922).
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president required the countersignature of a responsible govern-
ment minister in order to be valid.
In practice, the government exercised the most important ex-
ecutive powers. The general competence clause assigned the gov-
ernment all the executive powers not expressly granted to the pres-
ident. It was entrusted, among other things, with the legislative
initiative and the right to have bills enacted by public referendum
if they failed to garner a National Assembly majority.
As in other parliamentary democracies, the president was not
politically responsible to the Assembly. Rather, the government
bore political responsibility for its own as well as the president's
acts, for only the government stood under the threat of a parlia-
mentary vote of no confidence. This threat, however, was never
successfully invoked in Czechoslovakia between 1920 and 1938.
2. The legislature (National Assembly).
Until 1947, the Czechoslovak parliament consisted of two
chambers-a 300-member Chamber of Deputies and a 150-member
Senate. Both deputies and senators were elected on the basis of
universal, secret, direct, and equal ballot, with mandatory propor-
tional representation. Approval of both chambers was required to
enact legislation, but if the Senate disagreed with the Chamber of
Deputies, the Chamber could insist on enacting the bill by an af-
firmative majority vote.
The Assembly, besides being the supreme legislative body,
elected the president and participated in appointing the Constitu-
tional Court, treaty-making, and declaring war. As in the British
and French parliamentary models, the legal primacy over legisla-
tion belonged to Czechoslovakia's Assembly, but the real power to
draft and initiate legislation rested with the cabinet.
3. The judiciary.
Under the 1920 Constitution, a Constitutional Court, consis-
ting of seven members, was exclusively responsible for determining
whether statutes were in conflict with the Constitution. In practice,
however, the Court was never asked to determine whether a stat-
ute violated the Constitution.
In the First Republic, the protection of individual rights and
freedoms was secured through applications to the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court, which reviewed the validity of governmental de-
crees. It served as a court of appeals from all administrative bodies
and as the tribunal for litigating alleged violations of political
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rights. The Administrative Court was established in 1867 when
Czechoslovakia was still part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.
As Edward Taborsky, a secretary to the second president of the
interwar republic, later described it: "[It is] the child of the strug-
gle of the Central European peoples against a despotic government
and [it] represents the triumph of law over despotism. '6 Building
on this glorious inspiration, the Court evolved into a powerful tri-
bunal during the interwar period.7
4. Extra-constitutional factors.
This constitutional overview, however, explains only part of
Czechoslovakia's political democracy during the interwar period.
The real balance of power in the First Republic was quite different
from the scheme provided for by the Constitution. The two main
reasons why politics in practice varied so much from the constitu-
tional design were Czechoslovakia's party structure and the per-
sonalities and leadership of the two interwar presidents, Tomas
Masaryk and Edward Benes.
a) The parties. In reaction to the sudden liberation in
1918 from centuries of foreign domination, and in response to
Czechoslovakia's ethnic heterogeneity, a large number of parties,
representing every shade of political opinion, were founded. Some
of them encompassed all of the main nationalities-Czech, Slovak,
German, and Carpathian Ruthenian-while others included only
one national or ethnic group. Constitutionally mandated propor-
tional representation sheltered the small parties and precluded the
bigger ones from achieving the dominance necessary to control the
Assembly and form their own government. Coalition governments
were therefore the order of the day.
An Assembly member owed his seat entirely to the party, be-
cause the electorate had to choose among lists of candidates
presented by each party and could' not vote for different individu-
als presented by different parties. The parties had an additional
means to guarantee deputies' obedience: before elections, the party
made each candidate sign an undertaking that he would yield his
' Taborsky, Czechoslovak Democracy At Work at 132 (cited in note 3).
It is interesting to note that the Czechoslovak legal system has never and does not
currently recognize stare decisis. No rulings have de jure precedential value. It has been
suggested that, in order to achieve uniform compliance with the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms, stare decisis might be introduced to rulings of the Constitutional
Court. No decision on this has been adopted, however. See Part II.C.2.
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seat in the Assembly if asked to do so by the party. With this con-
stant threat of losing their seats, the deputies blindly followed the
party's will and rarely opposed its instructions.8
The most important channel for carrying out the party will
was the special political council (the "Petka," or the "Five"). This
body, consisting of the leaders of the political parties forming the
majority coalition, convened in private chambers, without public
scrutiny, and decided every major issue facing the republic.9
b) The presidents. Although the constitutional powers of
the president were weak on paper, the first two presidents enjoyed
immense personal prestige and became the real leaders of the new
country. Masaryk was called the President-Liberator or "Taticek"
("Daddy"). His collaborator and successor, Benes, enjoyed a simi-
lar reputation, although Munich tarnished it in the eyes of many.
Both leaders significantly influenced Czechoslovak politics by their
ability to counterbalance the power of the coalition parties.10 The
modern-day drafters are struggling to overcome the weakness of
the executive, fearing that the country might not always be blessed
with such charismatic and powerful leaders who are able to guide
and control the legislature."
C. 1938-1948
Czechoslovakia was one of the happier creations of the Treaty
of Versailles, but the Treaty spawned other disasters that led to
the rise of Nazi Germany and in turn to the destruction of Czecho-
slovak democracy. One factor in that demise was the restiveness of
the Slovaks as the minority partners in a unitary state dominated
by the Czech majority. 12
The Czechs have always outnumbered the Slovaks by more
than two to one. The Czechs staffed most of the administration in
£ As Taborsky put it: "Parliament ... became a collegium of several party groups,
acting and voting en bloc, according to principles agreed upon or laid down in advance."
Taborsky, Czechoslovak Democracy at Work at 104 (cited in note 3).
' Taborsky described the immense power of the "Five" as follows: "Having behind
them a compact mass of five big political parties with a majority of deputies clad in the
straitjackets of rigorous party discipline, [these 'Five'] could defeat the 'official' government
at any time, and thereby compel its resignation." Id.
10 Id at 113.
11 For a discussion of the current proposals for strengthening the power of the executive
over that of the legislature, see Part ll.D.
"1 Another factor was the pro-Nazi party among Czechoslovakia's 32 million German
minority in the Sudetenland, whose alleged oppression by the Czechoslovaks gave Hitler an
excuse to strike at Czechoslovakia.
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both regions, and in general dominated the country. Slovaks devel-
oped a feeling that they were being disdained and exploited. This
stimulated the formation of Slovak nationalist parties, some of
which were drawn to Fascism and anti-Semitism.
When Hitler went after Czechoslovakia in 1938, some Slovak
nationalists saw their chance. They declared Slovakia's autonomy
within the Czechoslovak state less than a week after Munich. They
declared complete independence on March 14, 1939, the day before
the Nazis took over what remained of the Czech region. From 1939
through 1945, Slovakia was a Fascist puppet state, led by Father
Jozef Tiso. It was viciously anti-Semitic-in 1942 it delivered some
60,000 Jews to Hitler for the death camps, nearly all of whom were
murdered-and sent its army to fight the Russians. 3 In time, how-
ever, many Slovaks turned against the Nazis. In 1944, they
launched a revolt led by an underground Slovak National Council,
the Slovak National Uprising, which had as one of its aims a resto-
ration of the Czechoslovak state but with a truly federal structure.
Upon liberation in May 1945, the Czechoslovak government
returned from exile in London and adopted a program granting the
Slovaks a somewhat ill-defined degree of self-determination within
the Czechoslovak nation. That development was soon crushed by
the communist takeover in 1948, which struck directly at national-
ism and the Church. The communists installed a tightly controlled
unitary state that was to govern the country for the next twenty
years.
D. 1948-1968
The communists junked the 1920 Constitution and replaced it
with a typical communist version, full of socialist principles,
worker autonomy, a paper bill of rights, and, of course, the en-
shrinement of the Communist Party as the "guiding force in soci-
ety and in the State."' 4 But it also bowed to Slovak nationalism by
creating separate Czech and Slovak National Committees with
considerable power, at least on paper, over their respective areas.
Built up over the ,twenty years of the prewar republic, Slovak
resentment simmered during this communist period. The commu-
23 Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia at 174-91 (cited in note 2); Karel Skalicky, The
Vicissitudes of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, 1918 to 1988, in Stone and Strouhal,
eds, Czechoslovakia 297, 309 (cited in note 2).
1' Constitution of 1960, Art 4, reprinted in Gisbert H. Flanz, Czechoslovakia 6, in Al-
bert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds, 4 Constitutions of the Countries of the World
(Oceana, 1990).
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nists simply swept the problem under the rug, however, by insti-
tuting a policy of forced homogenization-communists have always
claimed that the national question is secondary to and can be re-
solved by the development of communism, which will first assert
the primacy of the working class and ultimately eliminate both
class and national differences. 15 For two decades, the Slovaks were
relatively quiet, but they erupted again in the short-lived Prague
Spring of 1968.
E. 1968-1989
One of the central planks of the Prague Spring manifesto, the
Action Program, was a truly federal state in which the two repub-
lics would be the primary repositories of governmental power and
the central government would have largely derivative and carefully
enumerated limited powers. Even after Soviet and Warsaw Pact
tanks invaded Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, the impetus for
such a federal state continued, partly because the leader of the re-
action, Gustav Husak, was a Slovak and had been imprisoned in
1955 for his nationalism. In October 1968, the Constitution was
amended to create a federal state, and a constitutional court, to go
into effect on January 1, 1969. Power was divided between the fed-
eral government and the two republics, and local parliamentary
systems were established in the republics, with unicameral legisla-
tures (National Councils) and governments led by prime ministers.
As a further protection for the Slovaks, the 1968 constitutional
amendments created a bicameral legislature, with membership in
one house, the Chamber of the People, based strictly on popula-
tion, and the other house, the Chamber of Nations, divided be-
tween 75 Czechs and 75 Slovaks. Legislation concerning certain es-
pecially important matters such as citizenship, budget, taxes, votes
of confidence, and domestic and foreign economic matters required
an absolute majority16 of each national delegation in the upper
Chamber. The Constitution also required that constitutional
amendments be passed by a three-fifths absolute majority in the
lower chamber plus three-fifths of each national group in the
Chamber of Nations, giving a veto over important acts to 31 Czech
or Slovak members of the Chamber of Nations.
I" See Jozef Kalvoda, National Minorities Under Communism: The Case of Czechoslo-
vakia, 16 Nationalities Papers 1, 9-11 (Spring 1988).
16 That is, a majority of those elected, not just of those present.
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But the Slovaks were to be disappointed again. The Husak-led
"normalization" became simply the imposition, in a particularly
harsh and repressive form, of centralized communist totalitarian-
ism. The federalist institutions created by the 1968 constitutional
amendments, one of the few remaining vestiges of the Prague
Spring, turned out to be nothing more than a Potemkin village.
The restored communist bosses clamped down on any sign of inde-
pendence-political, intellectual, or cultural. The central govern-
ment, which in practice meant Party Secretary and later President
Gustav Husak, asserted the right to set aside laws passed by the
national legislatures. The new constitutional court specified in the
1968 amendments was never even set up.
Husak did provide certain special privileges to Slovakia, in-
cluding disproportionate investment, and jobs in the state and
Party administration. The government sought to equalize the edu-
cational levels between the two parts of the country, but the most
important parts of the economy were still in the Czech Lands.
Even today, the Slovak economy, which is concentrated in basic
materials production and heavy inefficient industry, remains
weaker than the Czech.17 The result of all this was, as one historian
put it, that "the Czechs now felt that they were being governed by
the Slovaks, while the Slovaks thought that it was once again
'Prague' that was depriving them of genuine home rule."'"
F. Contemporary Czechoslovakia
The downfall of the communist regime in November 1989 was
both unexpected and prepared-for.' As late as October 1989, there
was despair in Czechoslovakia that, as one person put it in a note
to the authors, "Everywhere else the world is turning upside down,
but here things stay the same." After 1968, the Czechoslovak peo-
ple had made a deal with the communists-the people would stay
out of politics and the regime would not bother them-and the
deal seemed to hold.
Below the surface, however, discontent had grown. In 1977, a
small group of intellectuals and artists, including playwright
Vaclav Havel, formed Charter 77 to try to enforce the Helsinki Ac-
cords. Despite severe persecution, Charter 77 survived and grew,
17 Kusin, The Road to the Current Debate at 12 (cited in note 2).
1g Id.
11 For a brief description of events prior to May 1989, see Herman Schwartz, Fueling
Demands for Czechoslovakian Reform, The Nation 660 (May 15, 1989). The best descrip-
tion of the velvet revolution remains Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern (Random
House, 1990).
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though it never went above 1200-1300 signatories. In March 1988,
there was a demonstration for religious freedom in Bratislava that
was put down brutally. On August 21, 1988, the twentieth anniver-
sary of the Soviet invasion, thousands demonstrated against the
regime, including many young people. Peace and civil liberties
groups began to proliferate. The regime wavered in its response,
now using repression, now showing a more liberal face.
On Friday, November 17, 1989, soon after the communist re-
gime began to topple in East Germany, thousands of young Czechs
turned a student march in commemoration of a student killed by
the Nazis in 1939 into a peaceful rally against the regime. The
communists responded brutally. From the following Monday, the
demonstrators started pouring into the streets of Prague and other
cities. A general strike a few weeks later drew an unexpected two
million supporters. A coalition formed around Havel in a move-
ment calling itself Civic Forum, with a parallel organization in
Slovakia, the People Against Violence. Within weeks, the commu-
nists gave up, and Havel became President on December 29, 1989.
The lack of violence, and the smoothness of the transition, led to
its name-the "velvet revolution." After adopting new election
laws in the spring of 1990, Czechoslovakia elected a new Federal
Assembly in June, which in turn reelected Vaclav Havel as Presi-
dent. Instead of the normal four-year terms, the Assembly and the
President have been elected for just two years, during which the
Assembly is expected to adopt a new constitution.
In the following sections of this Article, we discuss how the
new democratic government has tackled the four major constitu-
tional issues of federalism, the bill of rights, the independent judi-
ciary, and the separation of federal government powers among the
president, the cabinet,20 and the two chambers of the Federal
Assembly.
II. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS
In September 1990, a constitutional commission of National
Assembly members assisted by a committee of experts was ap-
pointed by the Assembly to draft a completely new document. The
leaders of the country decided, however, that certain sections of
the document-those dealing with federalism, the bill of rights,
and the constitutional court-would be adopted by the Federal As-
20 In the CSFR and other European countries, the cabinet is usually referred to as the
government. In this Article, the terms are used interchangeably.
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sembly first as amendments to the current Constitution, and then
incorporated later in the final text of the new constitution. Since
the 1960 Constitution, as amended in 1968, is still in effect, the
country has followed the existing amendment procedure, which re-
quires a three-fifths vote of each national delegation in the Cham-
ber of Nations as well as three-fifths of the members of the Cham-
ber of the People. But the formal amendment process is only part
of the story. Various groups in the country have spent and will
continue to spend months negotiating over the content of the con-
stitutional provisions that will eventually come before the Federal
Assembly for a vote. The players in the constitution-drafting pro-
cess include President Havel and Deputy Prime Minister Pavel
Rychetsky, Slovak political figures like Christian Democratic
Union leader and new Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky, the
two National Councils, and various political parties.
A. Federalism
This Section first examines the road to structural reform in
the federalism arena. It then considers two structural reforms in
particular: secession, and the division of power between the federal
government and the two national governments. Finally, we evalu-
ate these reforms.
1. Road to structural reform.
The achievement of substantial autonomy within a federal sys-
tem of government has been the Slovak goal since the republic was
founded over seventy years ago. That goal was also an unfulfilled
promise of the Prague Spring. Devising and adopting a system that
creates a central government with enough authority to deal with
the many daunting economic, ecological, social, political, and inter-
national problems that Czechoslovakia faces, while allowing the
Slovaks the degree of autonomy they demand, will be very
difficult.21
One major stumbling block is the reemergence of fierce ethnic
hostility between the Czechs and Slovaks. Czechoslovakia is not
21 There is another nationalist element in this mix: the Moravians and Silesians. Czech-
oslovakia is roughly divided into three parts, with Bohemia in the west, Moravia and Silesia
in the center, and Slovakia in the east. Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia comprise the Czech
Lands and currently fall under the Czech republic. Some Moravians and Silesians have been
agitating for autonomy, and even a three-republic state, but the Slovaks will have none of it,
for it would weaken their power. Jiri Pehe, The First Weeks of 1991: Problems Solved,
Difficulties Ahead, Report on Eastern Europe 9 (Mar 8, 1991).
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unique in this regard, for such quarrels, many of ancient origin,
have occurred throughout Eastern Europe since 1989. Communist
hegemony had largely suppressed these quarrels, but when the lid
was lifted, the animosities erupted again. Along with these ethnic
disputes, communism, with its tyranny, corruption, and ineffi-
ciency, has increased public skepticism of all forms of central gov-
ernment, even democratic ones.
The result is a trend toward centrifugalism that has mani-
fested itself in a widespread demand throughout Eastern Europe
for devolution of central authority into a loose form of federalism,
with power shifting from.the center to the regions. At this writing,
it is very difficult to imagine that Yugoslavia, for example, can sur-
vive even as a loose federation, let alone with the more centralized
structure it has enjoyed since World War I. The future shape of
the Soviet Union at this writing is equally obscure, for the giant
Russian Republic seems willing to enter into a loose "confedera-
tion" with many of the other republics, but the Baltic states, Ar-
menia, Moldavia, and Georgia want to be independent of the So-
viet Union and will be kept in it only by force.
Centrifugal ethnicity and regionalism are, of course, not pecu-
liar to Eastern Europe. There are intermittent separatist move-
ments in Italy, Spain, and even in Great Britain. There are also
numerous examples of successful federal systems with a reasonably
strong central government, such as the United States, Germany,
Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Spain, India, Brazil, and Argentina.
Of these, however, only Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada consist
of a few geographically separate, self-conscious ethnic groups, and
the only fully successful federation among the three is Switzerland.
Neither Belgium nor Canada has entirely succeeded in resolving
the difficulties of making one country out of two ethnically differ-
ent peoples, though Belgium seems to have achieved a modus
vivendi between its French and Flemish communities. Whether the
Czechs and Slovaks will be able to do as well as Belgium and Swit-
zerland remains to be seen.
The Czechs and Slovaks resumed their squabbling soon after
the velvet revolution took place in November and December 1989.
From the outset, the Slovaks made it clear that this time they were
determined to fulfill their yearning for a significant measure of
self-determination. Slovak political figures demanded various
forms of autonomy, ranging from full independence to near-inde-
pendence within a weak federal structure. The first eruption, in
April 1990, was over what to name the state, and nearly produced
a constitutional crisis. The solution was the cumbersome "Czech
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and Slovak Federative Republic", a slight variation on "Czechoslo-
vak. Federative Republic," the name adopted just one month ear-
lier. In March 1991, the Christian Democratic Union, Slovakia's
leading party, proposed a "treaty" between the two nations to form
a state with very limited power in the central government, from
which either nation could secede at any time.2 Tempers flared on
both sides. Some Czechs reacted by saying: "Let them go; we're
better off without them. 23
The actual strength and extent of the separatist impulse in
Slovakia as a whole is difficult to gauge. Recent polls show only a
small, though not insignificant, percentage of Slovak secessionists,
as well as a few Czech secessionists. 4 But for now at least, most
Slovaks seem to want what The New York Times called "an open
marriage, not divorce": a quite loose confederation of the two na-
tional republics, in which, with the exception of protection for ba-
sic rights and freedoms, the central government does not act di-
rectly on the people as a whole but only on the two governments.2 5
The Slovaks thus considered the first major issue to be the
division of power between the central (or federal) government and
the two national republics. To resolve this issue, the leaders of the
Czech and Slovak National Councils and of the federal government
met in a series of difficult, often acrimonious meetings between
August 9 and November 13, 1990.26 These meetings produced an
agreement among the prime ministers of the federal government
and the two republics on a constitutional amendment that was
adopted in November by the Slovak National Council.
22 This, of course, presupposes that the two nations are already separate and seems
inconsistent with the assumption, until now unquestioned, that the 1960 Constitution, as
amended in 1968, is still in effect. It may be based on a theory, propounded by one Slovak
scholar at a conference in Washington, D.C., on April 19, 1991 that the original 1920 Consti-
tution and all its successors were unconstitutionally adopted and therefore the two nations
are in the state of nature in which their declaration of independence and the collapse of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire left them in 1918.
22 Peter Martin, Relations Between the Czechs and the Slovaks, Report on Eastern
Europe 2-3 (Sept 7, 1990).
24 An opinion poll in June 1990 found that 8 percent of the Slovaks and 5 percent of
the Czechs wanted two completely independent states. Kusin, The Road to the Current
Debate at 5-6 (cited in note 2).
2 John Tagliabue, Slovaks Want an Open Marriage, Not Divorce, NY Times A12 (Dec
28, 1990). "Federations are communities of both polities and individuals and emphasize the
liberties of both .... Confederations, on the other hand, are primarily communities of
polities, which place greater emphasis on the liberties of the constituent polities." Daniel J.
Elazar, Exploring Federalism 93 (Alabama, 1987).
28 For a chronology of events, see Jan Obrman and Jiri Pehe, Difficult Power-Sharing
Talks, Report on Eastern Europe 5, 6-8 (Dec 7, 1990). For a Slovak view of these negotia-
tions, see Address by Slovak Republic Premier Vladimir Meciar, Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service-Eastern Europe 10 (Aug 30, 1990) ("Meciar Address").
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The Czech National Council, however, balked at the limited
powers the agreement gave to the federal government. First, it ob-
jected to the amendment's provision giving the power to declare
and protect the human rights of other minorities (for example,
Hungarians and Gypsies) to the two National Councils instead of
to the federal government. It also objected to the agreement's divi-
sion of authority to raise revenue for the three governments.2 7 This
eleventh-hour crisis impelled President Havel to make a stern and
ominous speech attacking Slovak separatism as suicidal for the
country and its new democracy.28 After the speech, the groups
reached a compromise that expanded the federal government's
power over minority protection, the post office, and oil pipelines,
and clarified federal power to raise taxes to carry out federal re-
sponsibilities. The agreement was then adopted by the Federal As-
sembly as a constitutional amendment on December 12.
With this amendment in place, the Slovak members of the
Federal Assembly joined in approving critical federal legislation
containing some of the economic measures necessary to create a
free market, most of which are now in force. 9 On January 27, 1991,
a bill of rights was adopted as a constitutional amendment, and
another amendment creating a Constitutional Court was adopted
on February 27, 1991.30 The rest of the Constitution, together with
possible revision of these amendments, will be treated in the final
overall document.
2. The constitutional amendment's provisions on federalism.
There are several fundamental elements of federalism now
built into the CSFR constitutional structure as amended by these
1. Jiri Pehe, Power Sharing Law Approved by Federal Assembly, Report on Eastern
Europe 6, 7 (Dec 21, 1990).
'a Burton Bollag, Havel Asserts Nation Faces Breakup, NY Times A12 (Dec 11, 1990).
" Under the communists, Czechoslovakia was among the most hostile of all the East
Bloc countries to private capital. Shortly after the revolution, the Assembly moved quickly
to amend the Constitution to allow the establishment of private businesses, including joint
stock companies. Later in 1990, it enacted laws for the privatization of small firms and, in
early 1991, the restitution of property and the privatization of large-scale enterprise. Small-
firm privatization had begun in late 1990. The law on restitution of property, designed to
restore nationalized property to its original owners, was very controversial, and difficult to
enact. The law on large-scale enterprise will probably not be implemented until the end of
the year. Jan Obrman, Two Landmark Bills on Privatization Approved, Report on Eastern
Europe 12 (Mar 15, 1991). In addition, the government removed price controls, made the
currency convertible, and is in the process of establishing capital markets. Jiri Pehe, The
Agenda for 1991, Report on Eastern Europe 11, 12 (Jan 18, 1991).
30 The texts of both amendments are on file with U Chi L Rev.
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constitutional amendments. First, the CSFR is stated to be a union
of two independent republics. While there is no explicit right of
unilateral secession, such a right is frequently asserted and rarely
challenged. Second, the federal government has only those rela-
tively few powers given it by the Constitution. The republics retain
all residual power. Indeed, the powers given the federal govern-
ment and the republics are intended to be mutually exclusive, with
as few concurrent powers as possible.3 ' The federal government's
powers include the authority to legislate the basic standards for
most governmental policies, but at least in theory the administra-
tion of many such policies is vested in the republics. Also, all high
political, judicial, and administrative offices are to be divided
equally between Czechs and Slovaks.2 Finally, the Constitutional
Court is to resolve jurisdictional disputes growing out of the above
arrangements.33 A relatively loose federation with a weak central
government is thus being created.
a) Independence and secession. The first clauses of the
1960 Constitution, as amended in 1968, define the sovereignty of
the two republics. Unlike the American Constitution, which begins
with a Preamble in the name of "WE, THE PEOPLE of the
United States," the Preamble to the Czechoslovak Constitution
opens with:
(1) The Czech and Slovak Federative Republic is a federative
State of two equal, fraternal nations, the Czechs and the
Slovaks.
31 In contrast, the 1968 amendments contained a long list of concurrent powers. See Art
8, reprinted in Flanz, Czechoslovakia, in Blaustein and Flanz, 4 Constitutions of the Coun-
tries of the World (cited in note 14).
32 Unbreakable tradition mandates that if the president is from one nation, the federal
prime minister must be from the other, and the same for the chairman and vice-chairman of
the Federal Assembly. Specific constitutional provisions mandate the same arrangement for
high administrative officials. See, for example, Article 105 of the 1960 Constitution covering
the procuracy; similar arrangements provide for different national backgrounds for the pres-
ident and the vice-president of the Constitutional Court, as well as an even division of the
twelve members of the Court (Articles 10, 11 of the Constitutional Act of February 27, 1991)
(on fie with U Chi L Rev), and an alternating presidency for the Central Bank (Article 12 of
the Constitutional Act of December 12, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
11 Associated with this dismantling of federal power are plans for strengthened local
governments which, under the communists, were merely vehicles for Party control. Now
local governments are to be governed by the republics. See Obrman and Pehe, Difficult
Power-Sharing Talks at 6 (cited in note 26); 1990 Constitutional Amendment, Art 4(7) (re-
public decides what property communities may have). Local government elections were held
on November 25, 1990.
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(2) The Czech and Slovak Federative Republic is founded on
the voluntary bond of the equal, national states of the Czech
and the Slovak nations, based on the right of each of these
nations to self-determination.3 4
Paragraph 4 of the Preamble then declares that the two republics
are to have "an equal position" in the federation, and the composi-
tion of the Federal Assembly, discussed earlier, reflects this, partic-
ularly the equal representation of Czechs and Slovaks in the
Chamber of Nations and the super-majority voting requirements.
Although the current Constitution has no explicit provision
about unilateral secession, there are indications that the new one
will allow each republic to secede virtually at will; whatever right
to secede presently exists seems to stem from a reading of the ref-
erences in the Preamble to a "voluntary bond" and "self-determi-
nation." A 1989 draft (now superseded) of a new constitution pre-
pared for Civic Forum by now-Deputy Prime Minister Pavel
Rychetsky, the government official in charge of the constitution
and other legislation, specifically declared such a right, as does the
CDU "treaty" mentioned above, and a draft constitution proposed
by President Havel in March 1991.35 No one, however, has at-
tempted to draft the provisions to deal with such controversial is-
sues as the division of assets, liabilities, and ongoing responsibili-
ties between the separating parties-issues that plague all divorces
and other separations.
b) The division of power between the federal state and
the two republics. The 1968 constitutional amendment established
concurrent jurisdiction for both the federal and republic govern-
ments over most matters, with exclusive federal or republic juris-
diction in just a few areas. The current arrangement, in contrast,
purports to establish spheres of exclusive jurisdiction for the fed-
eral government in a very few areas such as foreign policy, defense,
customs, and banking; some form of concurrent jurisdiction also in
a handful of areas yet to be determined; and exclusive jurisdiction
in the republics as to everything else. 6
The final version also gives the federal government power to
"codify" the laws in many of the fields nominally reserved to the
34 All quotations are from an official translation (on file with U Chi L Rev) unless oth-
erwise noted.
33 Copies of the CDU and Havel proposals are on file with U Chi L Rev.
36 The Havel proposal would give much more authority to the federal government but
as of this writing (April 1991) is not given much of a chance.
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republics. 37 The power to "codify" apparently means the authority
to pass laws setting legislative standards and guidelines in a field,
leaving the administration of those laws to the republics. The com-
mentary to an earlier draft of the 1990 amendment described this
codification power in the context of economic matters as follows:
"The role of the [federal government] ... is to create ... the con-
ditions for a uniform market. Therefore, the draft shifts the ...
fields of concept formulation and fundamental legislation" to the
federal government."38
For example, in the 1990 constitutional amendment, "concept
formulation and fundamental legislation" in the field of price pol-
icy is now a federal responsibility.3 9 The same federal authority to
"codify" now exists in such matters as foreign economic relations,
transport, communications, utility regulation, and the environ-
ment. In some of these fields, such as telecommunications and "nu-
clear [power] security," the federal government has the additional
authority to "exercise State supervision," "organiz[e] and control,"
and otherwise to exercise direct supervisory or operational
control.40
A current illustration of how things may work is the Federal
Assembly's recent enactment of the concept formulation and fun-
damental legislation on privatization. 41 Although much of the ad-
ministration of these laws will be at the republic level, the federal
policies have now been approved by the Czech and Slovak repre-
sentatives at the federal level, and in the administration of these
laws by the two republics, the agreed federal policies are expected
to prevail. But should the present political accord fall apart, there
is no assurance that the courts would uphold the federal policies;
there is not yet any supremacy clause establishing the primacy of
'3 Arts 10-28(b).
8 Commentary of the Slovak National Council on draft of the Constitutional Law
amending Constitutional Law No 143/1968 on Czechoslovak Federation C/2 (Nov 5, 1990)
(unofficial translation) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
39 See Constitutional Act of 1990, Art 15:
In the field of price policy the jurisdiction of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
shall include:
(a) the determination of the concept of the price policy and the declaration of principal
measures of price regulation,
(b) the codification of the price area.
40 In still other areas, such as oil and gas pipeline regulation and television, the lines
are either blurred or left for the future. See Constitutional Act of 1990, Arts 17, 20.
"1 On February 26, 1991, the Assembly approved a law on privatizing major state-
owned industrial enterprises. Another Law Crucial for Economic Reform Approved, CTK
National News Wire (Feb 27, 1991).
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federal law over state law, and the strong political opposition to
such a clause makes its adoption unlikely.42
Other provisions of the 1990 constitutional amendment may
help to create the necessary unity to address the country's pressing
economic and other problems. Article 4 declares that there is to be
a uniform Czechoslovak market integrating the economies of the
two republics, and Article 37 declares that the federal government
is authorized to create the legal codes for commercial law and se-
curities law, among other areas.43
In addition, the Czechs and Slovaks seem to have avoided one
major problem the United States faced under our Articles of Con-
federation-raising revenue. Under the 1990 constitutional amend-
ment, the federal government has the authority to impose turnover
and income taxes directly on the people; it need not depend on the
republics for funding its operations. However, we were told by one
official that the federal government is entitled to only 35 percent of
the take, much of which is eaten up by mandatory obligations.
Moreover, tax legislation is among the categories requiring an ab-
solute majority of each national delegation in the Chamber of Na-
tions, and obtaining such a majority from one delegation may be
difficult if the revenues from the taxes or other special purpose
funds to be raised are to be spent primarily in the other republic.44
3. Will the federalism experiment succeed?
Whether this experiment in loose federalism can succeed is
very uncertain. The institutional structure, with its divisions of au-
thority, its super-majority legislative requirements, and its insis-
tence on dividing all high federal offices equally between Czechs
and Slovaks, creates many obstacles to action and many opportu-
nities for impasse and immobility.45
42 See Part II.C. (on independent judiciary). Professor Jiri Boguszak, the head of the
Federal Assembly's committee of experts on the constitutional revision told the authors that
in his opinion, the "codification" power is of little significance, for a republic may ignore it
with impunity because of the absence of a supremacy clause, unless the matter is held to be
exclusively within the federal competence.
41 The Article also allows the federal government to create legal codes for courts, and, if
necessary for the "unity of the legal system," for minorities, churches, religious societies,
health care, and education below the college level. The German legislature has apparently
used a similar power extensively and effectively. However, the German example-in which
there are no ethnic divisions-may not be wholly applicable to the Czechs and Slovaks.
4' The tax power does, however, offer a possible federal lever. The Slovak Republic is
likely to require more financing than Slovak revenues alone can provide, which gives the
federal government political leverage to obtain Slovak agreement to expanding federal
powers.
4' The success with which the Slovaks have succeeded in their centrifugalism is some-
what surprising, for they are in a distinctly weaker position in the country. They are much
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On the other hand, there are few more difficult problems than
dividing and allocating power by mutual' agreement. The four
months that the Czechs and Slovaks took is not very long, espe-
cially given the many historical, emotional, and other antagonisms
involved. The fact that they resolved the last-minute crisis and fi-
nally reached agreement is certainly a hopeful sign, although a less
happy omen is that both sides already want to modify the
division.46
The common Czech and Slovak desire to enter the European
Community may also force a tighter union. The EC recognizes only
member states capable of discharging their responsibilities as
Community members, and it does not accept internal divisions as
an excuse for failing to implement Community directives. This
may mean that the CSFR will have to correct the inherent cen-
trifugalism of its constitutional structure before it can hope to join
the Community as a full or even associate member. Although some
Slovaks have expressed a desire to enter the EC as two virtually
separate states-"to have a separate seat," as one Slovak leader
put it in a private convershtion7--it is not likely that the Commu-
nity will accept this notion.4 8
The differences between the two nations are real, however,
and the federation mechanism the Czechoslovaks have adopted
will almost certainly be very difficult to operate. Just as Americans
poorer and will have to rely on Czech cooperation and support in the Federal Assembly to
obtain resources to ease the hardships that will result from the transition to a private enter-
prise economy, and from the conversion of their industry from armaments to civilian pro-
duction. Super-majority requirements and Czech resentment could easily produce deadlock
and no resources. There is also a fear in Slovakia that if the republic were to become fully
independent-which would happen if the Czechs were to secede, an easy matter under the
Slovak proposals-the Hungarian minority in southern Slovakia (and perhaps the Ukraini-
ans as well) would try to split off and unite with their ethnic relatives. Under the circum-
stances, the Slovak success in forcing the Czechs to accede to taking away so much power
from Prague and vesting it in the republics is both remarkable and possibly self-defeating.
46 Other disputes resolved after a near-crisis include disagreements over the bill of
rights and a restitution law, the latter of which was originally rejected by Slovak deputies.
See also Tagliabue, Open Marriage, Not Divorce (cited in note 25).
46 Peter Malanczuk, European Affairs and the 'Lander' (states) of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, 22 Common Mkt L Rev 237, 238 ("[t]he Community Treaties... refuse to
take notice of any internal subdivision within a Member State."). See also European Com-
mission Vice President Martin Bangemann: "[A] confederation cannot be a member of a
European union." Address, Mar 7, 1991, reprinted in Europe (Mar 8, 1991).
Belgian and French colleagues who work closely with the EC Commission told the au-
thors that when the Belgian and German governments have tried to justify a failure to com-
ply with Community directives on the ground of local autonomy over the subject matter,
Commission officials have rejected such explanations.
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found it necessary in 1787 to change our structure radically in or-
der to survive as a nation, so too the Czechs and Slovaks may have
to drastically change theirs. Whether they have the time to experi-
ment, given their immediate economic problems, and whether fu-
ture difficulties will bring them together rather than drive them
even farther apart, are questions that time alone can answer.
B. The Bill of Rights
The second critical issue that the Czechs and Slovaks agreed
to consider immediately was in the area of individual and minority
rights. On January 9, 1991, the Federal Assembly adopted a bill of
rights, the "Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms" (the
"Charter"), by the necessary super-majorities for a constitutional
amendment. The drafting of the Charter was a direct response to
the public demand that basic human rights and freedoms-so cal-
lously abridged by the previous regime-be protected immediately.
The Charter was the culmination of a long process of legisla-
tive deliberation, controversy, and compromise that reflected the
differing cultural, socio-political, and ideological persuasions and
aspirations of the deputies to Czechoslovakia's three parliaments.
The January 9 document had been preceded by several working
drafts, one of which passed both the Czech and Slovak National
Councils. The National Councils then presented a harmonized ver-
sion to the Federal Assembly, which adopted it with a few more
modifications.
The people of Czechoslovakia, proud of the brief democratic
period they experienced between the two world wars, turned to the
ideals of the interwar republic and used their 1920 legislative and
institutional forms as a model for the new Charter. This bill of
rights also incorporates principles of the European Convention on
Human Rights. Indeed, the proponents of the Charter urged that
the document be adopted as soon as possible, because early adop-
tion would assist Czechoslovakia in becoming a member of the
Council of Europe, the institutional incarnation of the Enlighten-
ment values endorsed by all European democracies.49 By adopting
the Charter, Czechoslovakia has signified to the world its firm com-
mitment to all the human rights proclaimed on the banners carried
11 On February 21, 1991, Czechoslovakia became a full member of the Council of Eu-
rope. Czechoslovakia Becomes 25th Member of the Council of Europe, CTK National News
Wire (Feb 21, 1991).
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by the crowds assembled in Prague and other cities during the ec-
static days of November 1989.0
In contrast to the eighteenth-century terseness of the Ameri-
can Bill of Rights and the French Rights of Man, the CSFR's
Charter is a detailed document divided into a preamble, a general
provisions section, and separate articles addressing human rights
and fundamental freedoms (including the rights of minorities), ec-
onomic, social and cultural rights, and judicial review, as well as
some features common to all the provisions.
1. The Preamble.
The Preamble mandates that all other constitutional acts, or-
dinary legislation, and secondary legislation must conform to the
Charter." It affirms the republics' power to enlarge the fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms beyond the scope of the Charter, but not to
narrow those rights.52 The Preamble also specifies that interna-
tional treaties concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms
that have been ratified by the CSFR are self-executing and prevail
over ordinary domestic legislation, but not over the Constitution
itself.53
2. 'General Provisions.
The Charter's section on General Provisions codifies the sepa-
ration of church and state. It contains a comprehensive non-dis-
crimination clause that prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex, race, skin color, language, faith, religion, political'persuasion,
ethnic or social origin, property, birth, or other status. 4 The Gen-
eral Provisions further stipulate that individual duties may be im-
posed only within the "limits of the law,"' 55 and that if rights and
freedoms are limited in certain exigencies, "the substance and
51 Addressing a session of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Czechoslovkia's Foreign
Minister, Jiri Dienstbier, expressed the country's commitment to the values representing a
common European heritage. He stated that his country's membership in the Council was
important to its "return to Europe" and its renewal as a democratic state. Membership
Approved, FBIS-EEU Daily Report East Europe 12 (Jan 31, 1991).
51 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms § 1 (Jan 9, 1991) (on file with U Chi L
Rev).
52 Id at § 2.
53 Id. Some states, such as The Netherlands, have recently amended their constitutions
to provide that such treaties and decisions of the tribunals they create do prevail over the
national constitution.
5Id at Art 3.
65 Id at Art 4.
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meaning of these [fundamental] rights and freedoms shall be
respected."56
3. Enumerated rights.
a) Human rights and freedoms. In the first section, "Fun-
damental Human Rights and Freedoms,"' 7 the Charter protects
the right to life, including an ambiguous clause (added as an inge-
nious compromise with anti-abortion groups) that "human life de-
serves protection already before birth. '"5  It also prohibits torture,
inhumane treatment, capital punishment, forced labor, slavery,
and wrongful imprisonment. It guarantees the inviolability of a
person's privacy and personal freedom. It protects the sanctity of
the home and human dignity, personal integrity, name, and good
reputation. It provides for the right to own property and protec-
tion against expropriation. It guarantees the privacy of letters,
freedom of movement, and freedom of thought, conscience, and re-
ligious conviction.
b) Political rights. The second section protects freedom of
expression and information; prohibits censorship; and guarantees
rights to petition and peacefully assemble, to freely associate, and
to participate in the administration of public affairs, either directly
or through elections. It also establishes a right to information on
government activity. Following a similar provision in the German
Constitution, it seems to protect the right of civil disobedience to
protest unlawful government conduct in extreme situations.5 9
56 Id at Art 4(4).
"' The official translation of the Charter refers in various places to "fundamental rights
and freedoms," "human rights and fundamental freedoms," and "fundamental human rights
and freedoms." It is too early to tell whether this linguistic inconsistency will someday be
interpreted to reflect intentional and substantive distinctions.
This inconsistency is particularly difficult to interpret in the case of Article 36(2). Ac-
cording to this provision, anyone claiming a violation of rights by an administrative decision
can turn to a court to have the decision judicially reviewed, unless the law provides differ-
ently. The article further states, however, that decisions affecting "fundamental rights and
freedoms listed in the Charter, may not be excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts."
Presumably this provision applies to the whole document-the official title of which is the
"Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms"-and not just to the rights listed in Chap-
ter Two, Division One-entitled "Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms"-which does
not include, for example, freedom of expression. (Freedom of expression falls under Division
Two, "Political Rights.")
"' How long before birth is not specified in the text.
59 "Citizens have the right to resist anybody who would remove the democratic order of
human rights and fundamental freedoms established by the Charter, if the work of the con-
stitutional organs and an effective use of legal means are frustrated." Art 23.
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c) Rights of national and ethnic minorities. The influence
of the 1920 Constitution on the Charter is probably most evident
in the provisions pertaining to ethnic and national minorities. The
1920 Constitution established equality between national, ethnic,
and religious minorities and the rest of the citizenry. National mi-
norities had the constitutional right, for example, to use their own
language in personal and business discourse, in the press, and in
religious institutions. The 1920 Constitution also gave minorities
the right to address authorities in their own language in districts
where they constituted more than 20 percent of the local popula-
tion. In addition, the' 1920 Constitution explicitly prohibited forci-
ble denationalization, and the state gave material support to
schools for minorities in districts with large minority populations.
The new Charter similarly guarantees minorities rights neces-
sary to safeguard their culture, language, and customs. Minorities
also have rights "under conditions set by law" to education in their
own language, to use their language when addressing authorities,
and to participate in the settlement of matters concerning them.
These rights are perhaps too broad and vague to be relied upon,
but they comply in form and substance with the minority rights
guaranteed by other European human rights documents.6 0
The vague language in the Charter also reflects compromise,
without which the various parties involved could not have agreed
on a final version of the Charter. The subject of minority rights
was a matter of bitter controversy between the Czech and the
Slovak deputies. The largest minorities in Czechoslovakia are Hun-
garians and Gypsies, both of whom live mainly in Slovakia.6 1 Ironi-
cally, some Slovaks, themselves a minority in Czechoslovakia and
before that victims of centuries of Hungarian cultural oppression
and forcible denationalization of the Slovak people, tried to limit
the language and cultural rights their own resident minorities
would enjoy.6 2 This seems to be partly in retaliation for the past
"0 The latest document recognizing the group rights of national and ethnic minorities is
the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimensions of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (June 29, 1990). Czechoslovakia participated in the
meeting.
81 Hungarians, with whom Slovaks have a long and unhappy history, account for some
11 percent of the population in Slovakia. Jozef Kalvoda, National Minorities Under Com-
munism at 17 (cited in note 15). It is very difficult to find estimates of the Gypsy popula-
tion, which is larger and growing. Id. Other important minority groups in Czechoslovakia
include Germans, Poles, and Ukrainians.
82 The Slovak National Council passed a very controversial language act in the fall of
1990. It proclaimed Slovak the official language in Slovakia, and gave minorities the right to
address authorities in their own language only in districts where they constitute more than
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oppression, partly from the fear of irredentism, and partly from
resentment at the past and continuing refusal to recognize Slovak
minority rights in Hungary.
d) Due process of law. The Charter also includes a chap-
ter on judicial and other legal protection. This chapter provides for
the judicial review of administrative acts, the right against self-in-
crimination, the right to counsel, and the right to public trial.
e) Economic and social rights. A significant but more
problematic section of the Charter concerns economic, social, and
cultural rights. The Charter provides substantially more protection
for social and economic rights than do most western constitutions
and human rights documents and it goes far beyond the marginal
treatment of these rights in the 1920 Constitution.13
The Charter recognizes the right to free choice of profession
and appropriate training, to make a living through gainful employ-
ment, to material security provided by the state for those unable to
work through no fault of their own, to fair compensation for work,
and to satisfactory working conditions. This section of the Charter
also guarantees free education through the secondary level; various
protections for women, adolescents, and the handicapped; free
.medical care under a system of public health insurance; and life in
a favorable living environment.
Many of these guarantees impose obligations on the govern-
ment that it may not have the financial ability to fulfill. But the
drafters of the Charter did not include these rights naively. Histor-
ically, the Czechs in particular have been known as an egalitarian,
socially conscious, even leftist nation. Furthermore, the post-1968
Communist Constitution, like the other East Bloc constitutions,
broadly guaranteed social and economic rights, including rights to
work, free education, and free medical care. At this point in Czech-
oslovakia's development, with the future so uncertain and econom-
ically grim, backtracking from the social guarantees of the previous
regime would not have been politically viable.
A final factor influencing the broad framing of economic rights
in the Charter was the common perception, shared even by various
20 percent of the local population, as in the 1920 Constitution. See Text of Controversial
Law on Slovak as Official Language, CTK National News Wire (Nov 9, 1990).
13 In his comments on the 1920 Constitution, Taborsky argues that "economic and so-
cial rights are an increasingly important factor in modern democracy. Any Constitution that
overlooks them, as do almost all existing Constitutions, is bound to be defective." Taborsky,
Czechoslovak Democracy at Work at 130-31 (cited in note 3).
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
drafters, that a constitution is a political declaration as well as an
instrument creating and guaranteeing real, substantive, and en-
forceable rights. Czechoslovakia is not alone in this perception. In-
deed, the German Constitution contains not only enforceable
rights, but also "political aspirations" that guide interpretation.
Thus, after long deliberation, and in appreciation of the differences
in practical enforceability between fundamental rights and free-
doms and the economic and social rights, the Czechoslovak draft-
ers included a provision, Article 41, which states that some of the
Charter's economic and social rights are only enforceable to the
extent provided by legislation implementing those rights. For all
practical purposes, they have been downgraded from rights to aspi-
rations and exhortations to the legislature.
4. The qualification of rights.
That the legislature can be trusted to implement and to pro-
tect fundamental rights is a theme that runs throughout the Char-
ter. Many of the Charter's ringing guarantees conclude with the
phrase "unless the law provides otherwise" or "unless limited by
law." Such caveats always seem dangerous to Americans, who fear
placing so much discretion in the legislature's hands, and prefer to
trust the courts to define the scope of any necessary exceptions.
But the European parliamentary tradition places great faith and
confidence in elected representative bodies. To Europeans, such
caveats are comforting guarantees of the supremacy of parliament
over the king and the king's judges. In the same vein, several arti-
cles of the Charter, following the European Convention, limit spec-
ified rights "if it is essential in a democratic society for protecting
the life or health of individuals, for protecting the rights and free-
doms of others, or for averting a serious threat to public security
and order." '64 But Article 4(4) counterbalances those ordre pub-
lique limitations and sets general restrictions on the limitations of
the fundamental rights and freedoms. Article 4(4) sets forth the
government's duty to respect "the substance and meaning of those
rights and freedoms." It further provides that "[s]uch limits may
not be misused for purposes other than those for which they were
intended."
64 See, for example, Charter, Art 12(3) (dealing with interference with sanctity of the
home). Other provisions include variations and expansions of these preconditions. See, for
example, Art 14 (freedom of movement and residence); Art 16 (freedom of religion); Art 17
(freedom of expression); Art 19 (freedom of peaceful assembly); Art 20 (freedom of associa-
tion); and Art 27 (freedom to create trade unions).,
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Moreover, despite much discussion, the final version of the
Charter does not specifically provide, as many European constitu-
tions do, for suspending rights in emergency situations.6 5 The
drafters had contemplated following the European Convention,
which sets a high threshold the state must meet before interfering
with its citizens' human rights and freedoms in an emergency, but
they could not agree on the text. The legislators are currently pre-
paring a separate specific act in a form suitable for later incorpora-
tion that will regulate emergency situations and specify measures
to be taken in the event of war or constitutional impasse.
5. Enforcement of rights.
However eloquently any particular right or freedom is in-
scribed in the Charter, it requires effective enforcement procedures
if it is to have real meaning. In Czechoslovakia's case, enforcement
procedures are particularly important. If the fundamental rights
and freedoms come to be perceived as merely aspirational, the new
Charter will be just as ineffective as the former Communist Consti-
tution in protecting fundamental rights.
In addition to domestic enforcement mechanisms, which are
discussed in the next section, Czechoslovak citizens can now peti-
tion the European Commission of Human Rights directly. Having
become a member of the Council of Europe in February 1991,
Czechoslovakia, after ratification, will be bound by Article 25 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees ac-
cess to the Commission for "any person, non-governmental organi-
zation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a viola-
tion by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth
in this convention." Of course, petitioning the Commission does
not provide speedy relief, for domestic remedies must first be ex-
hausted. Also, the Commission has limited power over member
states, and often cannot provide effective redress. More effective
relief would exist if Czechoslovakia also carries out its intention to
accede to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights,
e See Article 15 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms: "In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation, any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under interna-
tional law." (emphasis added).
For other examples, see Hungarian Constitution, §§ 8(4), 19(3)(i), reprinted in Blau-
stein and Flanz, eds, 7 Constitutions of the Countries of the World (cited in note 14); Ger-
man Basic Law, Art 80A, in 6 id; French Constitution, Arts 16, 36, in 5 id.
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whose decisions are binding on member states of the Council of
Europe.
C. The Independence of the Judiciary
Everyone involved in the current constitution-writing process
recognizes the need for an independent judiciary to enforce the
guarantees of the Charter. In addition, an independent judiciary is
necessary to resolve disputes about the division of powers between
the federal government and the republics, and to review the ac-
tions of all public officials for compliance with the Constitution
and the laws. The institution that will be responsible for fulfilling
these tasks is the Constitutional Court.
The 1920 Constitution provided for a constitutional court, but
this court was never asked to pass on the constitutionality of any
statute, although it did review the acts of some public officials. 6
The 1968 Act, which was written by the current Vice Chairman of
the Federal Assembly as a reformist measure during the Prague
Spring, also provided for such a court, but, like so many other pro-
visions of that act,67 it never went into effect. Nevertheless, the
1968 Act has served as the model for the provisions establishing
the new Court. The questions to be resolved regarding the Court
relate primarily to how best to assure the real independence of the
judges, and the power the Constitutional Court will have over the
republics.
1. The independence of the Constitutional Court.
Like the Federal Assembly, the structure of the Court has
been designed to assure an equal representation of Czechs and
Slovaks. The Court will consist of twelve judges: six Czechs and six
Slovaks."5 Equal representation forces an even rather than an odd
number of judges, thus heightening the likelihood of deadlock, es-
pecially because the Court is directed to hear and decide all cases
in panels of four. However, the current draft provides that if a
panel divides evenly, the case can be reviewed by all twelve judges.
In further contrast to the American system, the proposed act
exactly reverses our constitutional appointment process. Whereas
88 Taborsky, Czechoslovak Democracy at Work at 76-77 (cited in note 3).
67 See the discussion above of the federalism provisions in the 1968 constitutional
amendments.
" In keeping with the usual pattern, the president and vice president of the Court must
be from different republics.
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in the United States the president appoints Supreme Court jus-
tices by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,6 9 Constitu-
tional Court judges are to be nominated by the Presidium of the
Federal Assembly and appointed by the president. Whether the
president can refuse to appoint someone so nominated is not
specified.
The present draft of the provision establishing the Constitu-
tional Court follows the general European model of appointing the
judges for a term of years-in this case, seven-apparently with
eligibility for reappointment. In contrast to the American method
of appointment "during good Behaviour" 70 (i.e., for life), a short
seven-year term and the possibility of reappointment could well
lead to the judges' excessive dependence on the political bodies
that appoint and reappoint them, or at least the appearance of
such dependence.7 1 This could seriously hamper the Court's func-
tioning; public support, as in all constitutional democracies, will
depend on whether its members are perceived to be objective and
independent, or politically motivated because of their dependence
on the other branches for their appointment and reappointment.
Aware of this, some of the experts have indicated that the final
version of the constitution may specify a longer term without reap-
pointment, as in Germany.
Judicial independence is especially vital in Czechoslovakia,
where the jurisdictional problems reflect the underlying rivalry be-
tween Czechs and Slovaks and there is no tradition of strong and
self-confident judicial review. An acute shortage of experienced
judges who are not compromised by their judicial records under
the communist regime only exacerbates this concern. 2 The explicit
division between Czechs and Slovaks also raises appearance
problems, if nothing else, especially in the inevitably large number
of cases dealing with Czech-Slovak-federal jurisdictional
problems. 3
69 US Const, Art H, § 2.
70 US Const, Art m, § 1.
71 Compare Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714 (1986). German Constitutional Court judges
are ineligible for reappointment. Constitutional Court Act § 4(1) (1971); see generally Don-
ald P. Kommers, Judicial Politics in West Germany 88 (Sage, 1976).
7' The Czech republic alone is said to be short at least 330 judges. One hundred were
dismissed after November 1989, and another 120 left voluntarily, with only 115 new judges
appointed to replace them. Unfortunately, the salary and social status of judges are both
very low. Jan Obrman, Rehabilitating Political Victims, Report on Eastern Europe 5, 7
(Dec 14, 1990).
71 Because of the obviously political nature of the jurisdiction given many European
constitutional courts, which often includes electoral disputes, in some countries the judges
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Although the proposed Act is silent on the subject, the Consti-
tutional Court could follow the prevailing continental European
practice of voting secretly and publishing only one opinion of the
Court, regardless of the actual split among the judges. No dissent-
ing opinions would be published. Of course, this limitation would
deprive the legal profession and the public of the benefit of learn-
ing how and why the judges split over the issues. It also would
reduce the possibility that, as often happens when judges expose
their differences in dissenting opinions, the views of the dissenters
find public or scholarly support and become the majority view of a
later generation.
The reason for secret voting and the suppression of judicial
dissent is of course to protect individual judges from public criti-
cism and the threat of nonreappointment. These risks are thought
to be especially high in multinationality courts where publicity
might deter a judge from voting against the interests of the coun-
try or region she represents. But the costs of secrecy are also high,
and secrecy may do more to weaken public respect for a court and
the integrity of its processes than to strengthen it.74
2. The Court's jurisdiction and its power over the republics.
The Court will not be one of general jurisdiction. Instead, its
jurisdiction will be limited to adjudicating jurisdictional disputes
between federal and republic agencies, and cases in which there is
a question as to whether federal and republic statutes and other
actions conform to federal constitutional law and human rights
treaties.75 The capacity of the Court to resolve such jurisdictional
disputes in favor of the federal government will be much weaker
are appointed on an explicitly political basis. See Carl Baar, The Courts in the Federal
Republic of Germany, in Jerold L. Waltman and Kenneth M. Holland, eds, The Political
Role of Law Courts In Modern Democracies 92-93 (St. Martin's, 1988); Mauro Cappelletti,
The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective 138 (Clarendon, 1989) (Germany,
France); see also Belgium, where half the twelve judges are French and half are Flemish,
Belgian Const Arts 21, 22; Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law
252-53 (Cambridge, 1989) (France).
To reinforce the Czechoslovak Court's independence, it has been located in Brno, which
is in Moravia, not in Prague nor Bratislava. It seems that some judges living in Prague or
Bratislava may not want to move to Brno. Given the small pool of eligible judges, this could
create difficulty in finding enough qualified jurists for the Court.
7' Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg announces its
votes and publishes dissenting opinions, as does the International Court of Justice in The
Hague, yet public respect for these tribunals is certainly high. An interesting compromise is
contained in a German statute that required secrecy in the initial years of the German Con-
stitutional Court's existence, but not thereafter.
" Art 2, quoted in text at note 76.
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than the comparable capacity of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Our Constitution recognizes the possibility of overlap or
conflict between federal laws and treaties adopted in exercise of
the federal government's enumerated powers, and state laws
adopted pursuant to the Constitution's general reservation of all
other powers to the states. Our Supreme Court can invoke Article
VI of our Constitution, which makes "the supreme Law of the
Land" not only the Constitution itself but also the laws "made in
pursuance thereof."
Because of Slovak opposition, the constitutional amendments
adopted so far mandate the supremacy only of federal constitu-
tional law and human rights treaties over republic law, but not of
federal statutory law over republic constitutional or statutory law.
Thus, Article 2 establishing the Court's jurisdiction provides only
that:
The Constitutional Court shall rule on whether
(a) Acts of the Federal Assembly and Legal Measures of
the Presidium of the Federal Assembly conform to the Consti-
tutional Acts of the Federal Assembly;
(b) Acts of the Federal Assembly, Constitutional Acts and
other laws enacted by the Czech National Council, and Con-
stitutional Acts and other laws enacted by the Slovak Na-
tional Council conform to international treaties on human
rights and fundamental freedoms, ratified and promulgated
by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic;
(c) Constitutional Acts and other laws enacted by the
Czech National Council and by the Slovak National Council,
and Legal Measures of the presidium of the Czech National
Council and the presidium of the Slovak National Council
conform to the Constitutional Acts of the Federal Assembly;
(d) decrees of the Government of the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic and legal regulations issued by Federal min-
istries and other Federal organs of state administration con-
form to Constitutional Acts and other laws enacted by the
Federal Assembly;
(e) decrees of the governments of the Czech Republic and
of the Slovak Republic and legal regulations issued by minis-
tries and other organs of state administration of the Czech
Republic and of the Slovak Republic conform to Constitu-
tional Acts and other laws enacted by the Federal Assembly. 6
' Art 2, as amended by the Constitutional Act of February 27, 1991 (on file with U Chi
L Rev).
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A supremacy clause, of course, recognizes that powers cannot
be divided precisely between a federal government and its constit-
uent states, and that situations will arise in which the actions of
one overlap or are inconsistent with those of the other. The Slovak
argument appears to be that a surgically precise division of juris-
diction between the federal government's authority and that of the
republics can be and has been made, and that a supremacy clause
is therefore unnecessary-conflicts between federal and republic
statutes can be resolved by determining which has jurisdiction
under the constitution. This is, however, highly implausible.7 7 The
unspoken argument, of course, is that preferring federal statutes to
those of the republics is unacceptable to Slovakia.78
The supremacy problem is aggravated by a novel ambiguity in
Article 3(1), which provides for the nullification of legal measures
inconsistent with the Constitution, treaties, or federal law (where
federal law prevails, for example, over conflicting administrative
decrees), but also provides that,"this shall not apply to Constitu-
tional Acts of the [republic] National Councils. '7 9 What this means
is not at all clear. If it is intended to leave it up to the republics
themselves to annul those of their constitutional acts inconsistent
with the federal Constitution or treaties, there will be even more
confusion, conflict, and deadlocks, because the republics may well
insist on keeping their own constitutional acts in effect. So far,
there seems to be no provision for resolving such a conflict.
Without a supremacy clause, there will be continuous clashes
of authority between federal officials operating under federal law
and republic officials, with no ready means to resolve them. Such
clashes are especially likely given Slovak hostility to Prague cen-
tralism, and could wreak havoc on the economic and environmen-
tal reforms that are clearly within the jurisdiction of both federal
and republic governments. As Holmes said of our country:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we
[the federal courts] lost our power to declare an Act of Con-
' See Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective at 169, 313 (cited
in note 73) ("Federalism ... demands the affirmation of some degree of preeminence of a
federal law over local, regional, or state laws, as well as respect for boundaries of federal
jurisdiction.").
7'8 The issue might be resolved in the highest court of general jurisdiction in Czechoslo-
vakia, the federal Supreme Court, given that the judiciary article for courts of general juris-
diction is still to be written. The drafters are setting up the Constitutional Court to handle
such controversies, however, and it is unlikely other courts will be allowed jurisdiction over
them.
71 Article 3(1), Constitutional Act of February 27, 1991 (on file with U Chi L Rev).
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gress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we
could not make that declaration as to the laws of the Several
States."
These problems may be resolved in the final comprehensive federal
constitution, but many seem inherent in the Slovak insistence on
substantial independence and may be intractable.
With respect to human rights, the Court has specific jurisdic-
tion to resolve disputes in which individuals challenge official ac-
tions that are allegedly inconsistent with the federal Constitution
and international human rights treaties. This jurisdiction may ap-
parently be invoked by private citizens seeking recourse directly
from the Court, subject however to the Rules of the Court, which
may require prior recourse to some other court. If the German ex-
perience is a valid precedent, human rights cases will account for a
large part of the Court's docket.
Article 3(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides
that everyone in the federation has the same basic human rights.
This should provide ample basis for the Court's human rights deci-
sions to be the ultimate authority throughout the federation, and
for the Court to strike down violations of these rights by laws or
official acts of the two republics as well as by the federal govern-
ment. Thus, the provision on the universality of rights will proba-
bly act as a de facto supremacy clause, at least in regard to these
issues.
However, a prominent judge in Slovakia declared in a private
conversation with one of the authors that he did not believe that
the federal Constitutional Court should have the last word on
human rights issues arising out of laws or official actions of the
republics. In his view, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak re-
public should review the actions of Slovak organs, and the Czech
Court should review the actions of Czech organs. This could of
course produce inconsistent rulings from the two regional constitu-
tional courts, raising the possibility of different safeguards in the
two republics for the same or similar rights. Because there is no
specific provision for review by the federal Constitutional Court of
the constitutional rulings of the republic constitutional courts, the
federal Constitutional Court may someday have to decide whether
such a power is implicit under Article 3(1). The standing rules in
8o Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 295-96 (Peter Smith, 1952); see gen-
erally Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perpsective (cited in note 73).
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Article 8 also allow both federal officials and private natural or le-
gal persons to bring proceedings before the federal Constitutional
Court."' Individuals may thus have a choice of forum and may be
able to circumvent the risk of an unfavorable republic Court deci-
sion by going directly to the federal Constitutional Court.
The very broad standing rules in Article 8 summarized above
are a reaction to the very limited standing in the 1920 Constitu-
tion, which is said by some to be an important reason that the first
Constitutional Court did so little.8 2 There is a danger, however,
that such broad access could overwhelm this new and inexperi-
enced tribunal with an avalanche of difficult cases.
D. Separation of Federal Legislative and Executive Powers
The provisions governing the separation of legislative and ex-
ecutive powers at the federal level have yet to be determined. As
noted in the introductory section, prewar Czechoslovakia had a
parliamentary form of government dominated by the Czech major-
ity, with the principal executive powers vested in a cabinet of legis-
lative leaders and with a figurehead president elected by the legis-
lature. The 1968 change from a unitary system of representative
government to a federation of two republics was constructed to
give the Slovak minority in the legislature an absolute veto power
over the Czech majority. This was never a problem in the days
when the Central Committee of the Communist Party made all the
important decisions. But in the true democracy that now prevails,
nothing can be accomplished without the agreement of both legis-
lative groups. Agreement has been reached on some subjects, such
as the bill of rights and a few of the laws essential for the transi-
tion to a free market. On many other critical issues, however, there
is a growing sense of frustration over the deadlocks that have oc-
curred, and a growing conviction that the federal government may
be unable to act decisively at a time of economic or political crisis.
As a result, President Havel, members of the federal cabinet, and
81 Under Article 8, the Constitutional Court can initiate proceedings on jurisdictional
matters upon the request of the president, the Assembly, any federal or republic state or-
gan, the National Councils, a court of justice, the prosecutor general, and, in jurisdiction
cases, by one fifth of the members of any of the federal or two republic parliaments; on
human rights questions, by any natural or legal person; and on political questions, by any
person authorized to act for the political group involved.
82 Taborsky, Czechoslovak Democracy at Work at 77-78 (cited in note 3). Access was
limited to the Supreme Justice, Administrative and Electoral Courts, and the two legislative
chambers and the Diet of Russinia, an autonomous area. See V. Joachim, Rules of
Franchise; The Constitutional Court, 179 Intl Conciliation 17, 28 (Oct 1922).
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their advisors have been studying a number of possible changes in
the existing structure and powers of the legislature and the
presidency.
A number of these proposals are included in a draft of a new
constitution prepared at the direction of President Havel and cir-
culated by him in March 1991 to leaders of the main political par-
ties, the Federal Assembly, and the governments of the two repub-
lics. This is one of a number of initiatives Havel has recently
launched to spur the process of constitution-making, which accord-
ing to Czechoslovak parliamentary tradition has been considered
as the exclusive province of the legislature. He has initiated regular
meetings of federal, republic, and party leaders on the subject at
Lany, his official country residence; he has urged the Slovaks to
conduct a referendum on whether they want to remain within the
federation or not; and he has made several speeches urging the na-
tion to rise above its ethnic rivalries and get on with the constitu-
tion-making task.
The principal changes under consideration are summarized
below. They include:
(1) strengthening the executive powers of the president,
(2) changing the process for electing the president,
(3) changing the structure of the two legislative chambers and
modifying the supermajority requirements for the approval of
major legislation and constitutional amendments,
(4) resolving legislative deadlocks on constitutional amend-
ments and government organization by a referendum of the
people.
1. Increasing the powers of the president.
Under the 1968 Constitution, the president's powers are lim-
ited to conducting foreign affairs, serving as commander-in-chief of
the Armed Forces, appointing and recalling the prime minister and
other members of the government, dissolving the Federal Assembly
if it cannot agree on a budget, and calling for new legislative elec-
tions. He does not have the American president's power of vetoing
legislation or the French president's power to dissolve the legisla-
ture at any time for any reason, or to go over the legislature's head
to enact certain types of legislation by referendum of the people, or
to legislate by decree in an emergency.
President Havel's draft constitution does not grant veto power
to the president, but it would make the president's power to dis-
miss the Federal Assembly almost as broad as the French presi-
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dent's. He could do so if the Assembly has voted no confidence in
the government, or if it fails to pass a government draft of a law
within five months after submission. The Havel draft would also
give the president the power to initiate a referendum (discussed
below) for the enactment by popular vote of a constitutional
amendment or other change in the political structure.
Finally, the Havel draft would include the French president's
power to legislate by decree in national emergencies. The president
could declare a state of emergency in time of war, violent disrup-
tion of the constitutional organization, or threats to health or pa-
ralysis of the economy. Except in wartime, a state of emergency
could not last more than ninety days and would require the con-
sent of the federal government as well as the government of the
republic in which the emergency exists. If the Federal Assembly
does not approve the state, of emergency within forty-eight hours
of its declaration, the declaration would no longer be effective.
During the state of emergenicy, the president and the cabinet could
govern by decree, and could restrict various rights and freedoms
other than the right to life and the abolishment of the death pen-
alty, freedom from torture, the right to own property, freedom of
thought and religion, freedom of scientific research and artistic
creativity, and freedom from prosecution under ex post facto laws.
2. Direct election of the president.
A number of Czech and Slovak participants in the drafting
process have discussed the direct election of the Czechoslovak
president, along the lines of the French model. The French system
provides an interesting compromise between the presidential and
parliamentary systems. It combines a traditional parliamentary
system with a president who is elected by the people of the entire
nation and who possesses significant executive powers.
Those favoring direct election argue that real political benefits
might follow if the new Czechoslovak constitution provided for a
president elected directly by all the people. If a future Czechoslo-
vak parliament should deadlock because of Czech-Slovak disagree-
ment and the breakup of multi-party coalitions, a president elected
by all the people could have the mandate and the stature needed
to persuade members to change their votes and resolve the
deadlock.
Importantly, direct popular elections of the president would
also encourage the formation of truly national political parties. At
present, the only truly national political party is the Communist
Party. In addition, direct presidential elections could reduce the
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number of viable political parties to a more workable level. It
would provide a useful offset to the divisive ethnic, cultural, reli-
gious, and occupational interests that have dominated party organ-
izations and programs throughout Czechoslovakia's history.
Yet, the direct election of the president would pose special
problems in an ethnically divided country like the CSFR. The
Slovak community might fear that in a direct national presidential
election the candidate favored by the Czech majority would always
win, and that a more powerful president would not be sufficiently
responsive to Slovak concerns. The proponents of direct election
believe this fear could be alleviated in several ways. First, the con-
stitution might provide for both a president and a vice president,
and require that the president and vice president could not be citi-
zens of the same republic. 3 This would oblige each party to nomi-
nate a Czech and a Slovak to run in tandem for these offices and
would enhance the ability of each party's presidential and vice
presidential nominees to win votes throughout the nation. Voters
would be required to cast their votes for a single pair of presiden-
tial and vice presidential candidates, as in the United States, and
would not be allowed to "split" their ballots.
Another way to protect the Slovaks' voting interest would be
to require that a candidate win a majority of the voters in each
republic in order to be elected, with a tie-breaking mechanism in
case different candidates win a majority in each republic. For ex-
ample, if one candidate wins a majority of the votes in the Czech
republic and the other candidate wins a majority of the votes in
the Slovak republic, the election could be determined by majority
vote of the Chamber of Nations, where the two republics have
equal representation. If the vote in the Chamber of Nations re-
sulted in a tie, the Chamber would continue to ballot until one
candidate wins a majority.
Finally, the constitution could make it compulsory for a presi-
dent who is a Czech citizen to continue the existing practice of ap-
pointing a Slovak citizen as prime minister, and vice versa. It could
also require that at least one-third of the federal cabinet consist of
Slovak citizens, and that at least one-third consist of Czech
citizens.
In addition to the Slovak fear that Czechs will dominate presi-
dential elections, the former communist states have developed a
healthy antipathy toward dictatorship. In the CSFR, where memo-
83 Compare US Const, Amend XII.
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ries of the communist dictatorship are fresh, there may be some
concern about the risk that a popularly elected president with sig-
nificant powers might abuse those powers to reassert tyrannical
control over his fellow citizens. Similar concerns were recently
raised in opposition to President Gorbachev's successful amend-
ment of the Soviet Constitution to provide for a direct presidential
election in 1994.4 Francois Mitterand made similar arguments
when he opposed the Gaullist proposals that became the constitu-
tion of the Fifth Republic. But subsequent experience in France,
including Mitterand's own two terms in the Elys6e Palace, as well
as the political history of the United States, have shown that so
long as the constitutional structure maintains a sufficient tension
of checks and balances between the branches, there is little basis
for such concern. Poland has recently conducted a direct presiden-
tial election and, as a result, President Lech Walesa's moral and
legal authority has been greatly enhanced.
The Havel draft of the new constitution does not go all the
way toward direct election of the president, but it does take a ma-
jor step in that direction. It continues the present process of elec-
tion by the Federal Assembly, but it provides that if no candidate
wins a two-thirds majority of the Czech and Slovak members,
counted separately, on the first ballot, or an absolute majority,
counted separately, in a second ballot run-off between the two top
contenders, a public referendum would be held in which the win-
ner would need an absolute majority of the Czech votes and of the
Slovak votes, counted separately. If no one achieves both these ma-
jorities on the first public referendum ballot, there would be a sec-
ond ballot in which the winner would need only an absolute major-
ity of all Czech and Slovak votes combined.
3. Changing the legislative structure and modifying the
super-majority procedures.
As noted above, the Federal Assembly now consists of two
chambers-a Chamber of the People consisting of 200 members
elected by direct vote throughout the CSFR and a Chamber of Na-
tions consisting of 150 members, half elected from the Czech re-
public and half from the Slovak republic. Minor legislation can be
passed by a simple majority vote of both chambers. Important leg-
islation, however, requires a simple majority vote in the Chamber
8 See Michael Dobbs, Moscow Creates Strong Presidency, Wash Post Al (Mar 14,
1990); Victor Danilenko, Gorbachev: No Dictator, Wash Post All (Mar 19, 1990).
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of the People and a "qualified" majority vote in the Chamber of
Nations, "qualified" meaning a majority of the Czech members and
a majority of the Slovak members, counted separately. Constitu-
tional amendments, election of the president, and decisions declar-
ing war require a three-fifths majority in the Chamber of the Peo-
ple and a "qualified" three-fifths majority of the Chamber of
Nations.
This structure gives absolute veto power over important legis-
lation and constitutional amendments to the members elected
from Slovakia. While they are a minority of only one-third in the
Chamber of the People, they have equal representation in the
Chamber of Nations, which consists of 75 elected Czechs and 75
elected Slovaks. If the 75 Slovaks in the Chamber of Nations vote
as a block, they can defeat any legislation. If a minority of 31 vote
in the negative, they can defeat constitutional amendments and
other major acts requiring a three-fifths majority; a bare majority
of 38 voting in favor of a motion of no confidence will bring down
the federal government. The authors know of no democratic gov-
ernment anywhere in which comparable minorities of legislative
bodies have as much blocking power.
The Havel draft constitution proposes to deal with this over-
arching problem in several ways. The Chamber of the People
would be renamed the Federal Assembly, and the Chamber of Na-
tions would be replaced by a new Federal Council consisting of
thirty members: the Chairman and 14 members of the Presidium
of the Czech National Council and the same officials of the Slovak
National Council, just as the German Upper House, the Bundesrat,
consists of the legislative leaders of each of the German states (the
lhnder).
Under the Havel draft, the passage of all laws, minor and ma-
jor, would require a qualified majority in the Federal Assembly.
Constitutional amendments and declarations of war would require
a three-fifths supermajority of Czech members and of Slovak mem-
bers, again counted separately. All measures passed by the Federal
Assembly must be submitted to the Federal Council, which can
disapprove them by a two-thirds vote and return them to the As-
sembly. But if the Federal Assembly then repasses the bill by a
three-fifths vote of the Czech and Slovak members, counted sepa-
rately, the bill becomes law.
The Havel draft also retains the power of the Federal Assem-
bly to dismiss the federal government by a vote of no confidence,
but provides that it must be passed by an absolute majority of all
Czech and Slovak members, counted together rather than sepa-
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rately. This is a major improvement on the post-1968 Constitution,
under which a majority of the Slovak members in the Chamber of
Nations alone is sufficient to pass a resolution of no confidence.
Under these proposals, the power of the Slovak members to
block major legislation is essentially preserved, but in a somewhat
diluted form. Approximately one-third of the members of the Fed-
eral Assembly will be elected from Slovakia. A majority of this
Slovak minority will no longer be able to block ininor legislation
but will retain its present power to block major legislation. Forty-
one percent of the Slovak minority will retain its present power to
block constitutional amendments and a declaration of war. But not
even the entire Slovak minority will be able to pass a motion of no
confidence, if the majority Czech members vote to support the
government.
More significantly, the abolition of the Chamber of Nations
will bring the elected leaders of the Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic directly into the federal legislature as members of the
Federal Council. They will no longer be able to distance them-
selves from the federdl government or avoid responsibility for its
failure to act responsibly. This change could help to improve the
chances of responsible compromise between national and regional
interests, as has proved to be the case in Germany.
4. Legislation by referendum.
Under Article 46 of the 1920 Constitution, the cabinet was au-
thorized to call for a referendum of the people if Parliament re-
jected a bill presented by the government. This power was left out
of the 1960 Constitution and the 1968 amendments, but President
Havel has recently proposed to revive it in a limited form similar
to the referendum power of the French president. Under Article 11
of the French Constitution, the president, on the proposal of the
cabinet, may call a referendum on any bill dealing with the organi-
zation of the government, the approval of an EEC agreement, or
the ratification of a treaty affecting the formation of French
institutions.8 5
Under President Havel's draft constitution, the president
would be authorized to call for a referendum on any constitutional
act "concerning the principal problems of the political system or
85 For the text of the French Constitution and Article 11, see Vlad G. Spitzer, France
25, in Blaustein and Flanz, eds, 5 Constitutions of the Countries of the World (cited in note
14).
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the organization of the State," a change in the boundaries of the
nation, the deployment of foreign armies in CSFR territory or of
the CSFR army abroad, or a proposal for the secession of the
Czech republic or the Slovak republic from the federation. In the
last case, the president would have discretion to call for the refer-
endum only in the republic wishing to secede.
The president would be required to promulgate a referendum
if the Federal Assembly requests him to do so. He would also have
discretion to promulgate a referendum if requested to do so by the
federal government or the government of the Czech republic or the
Slovak republic. The proposals submitted to referendum would be
enacted if approved by a majority of all the voters in both the
Czech republic and the Slovak republic combined. 6
If all four of the above proposals were adopted, the ability of
the federal government to act decisively would be enhanced. But
several parts of this package are likely to encounter serious opposi-
tion precisely because they tend to reduce the present power of the
Slovak community to block any legislation it opposes. Moreover,
direct election of the president and the expansion of presidential
powers run counter to the parliamentary tradition of Czechoslova-
kia's earlier democratic experience, and to the widespread concern
about a return of dictatorship. The referendum power, if invoked
to force a showdown on breaking up the existing federation, could
increase the risk that a break up would actually occur, and that
after the two republics went their separate ways, each would be
less able to resolve its economic problems or play a significant role
in the future economic and political development of Europe. Fi-
nally, if the power to declare an emergency were to be abused, the
threat to human rights and the risk of dictatorship would be
enhanced.
For all of these reasons the adoption of President Havel's en-
tire package of proposals is problematic. But if none of his recom-
mendations are approved, the ability of a democratic CSFR to gov-
ern itself effectively will be seriously diminished.
If most or all of President Havel's proposals are rejected, an-
other alternative worthy of consideration is the Constitution of
Belgium, a nation with a comparable ethnic division among a
Flemish (Dutch) speaking community in the eastern part of the
country (about 55 percent), a French speaking community in the
western portion (about 40 percent), and a German speaking com-
0' In the case of a referendum on secession conducted only in the republic proposing to
secede, a majority of the voters in that republic would be sufficient.
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munity in the south (about 5 percent). Belgium is a constitutional
monarchy with a unitary bicameral legislature and three separate
"communities"-French, Flemish (Dutch), and German. Each
community has legislative power over ethnic issues such as educa-
tion, the right to speak and address the authorities in one's own
language, personal identity, and cooperation between and among
the communities.8 7 General laws come under the authority of the
legislature, which acts by majority vote, except for constitutional
amendments, which require a two-thirds vote. Each chamber of
the legislature is divided into linguistic sections, but only for the
purpose of enabling each section, by a 75 percent majority, to ob-
ject to a proposed bill on the ground that it would have "a serious
effect on relations between the communities." In such cases the
Council of Ministers (the government) must make a reasoned re-
port within thirty days defending the bill or accepting various
modifications. After this procedure is followed, the bill may be en-
acted by majority vote of all members.
This system has worked reasonably well in Belgium, primarily
because the French speaking and Flemish speaking communities
have been willing to compromise and defer to one another on eth-
nically critical issues. If the Czechs and Slovaks cannot resolve
their ethnic differences in any other manner, they would be well
advised to take another look at the Belgian system.
CONCLUSION
The first elected post-communist government of Czechoslova-
kia is just completing the first year of its two-year term. Sitting as
a legislature, it has already enacted much of the statutory frame-
work for turning a centrally planned state economy into a market
economy. Sitting as a constituent assembly, it has adopted amend-
ments to the 1960 Communist-era Constitution with its 1968
Amendment that reallocate legislative powers between the federal
government and the governments of the Czech and Slovak repub-
lics, create a modern bill of rights, and establish a Constitutional
Court to resolve constitutional disputes relating to the allocation of
powers and the enforcement of citizen rights. None of these
amendments fully meets the standards of western constitutional
scholars or indeed of the Czechs and Slovaks themselves; all are
87 In addition to the three communities, the constitution provides for three regional
institutions (the Walloon region, the Flemish region, and the Brussels region where French
and Dutch are both spoken) to which many regional government powers are assigned.
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subject to revision in the final document. Nevertheless, they are a
remarkable achievement for a nation that has not governed itself
or experienced democracy for more than forty years.
In the remaining year of its mandate, this first post-commu-
nist elected regime faces many formidable challenges, both eco-
nomic and political. Some of those challenges-particularly the
separation of executive and legislative powers and the extraordi-
nary blocking power of the Slovak members of the legisla-
ture-may indeed prove too difficult to overcome. But based on
their track record to date, and assuming that the separatist forces
in their society do not split the federation into two independent
republics, the Czechs and Slovaks have a good chance of complet-
ing and adopting a constitution that is democratic, workable, and
wholly consistent with the rule of law.

